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THE OBLIGATORY STRUCTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW: 
UNBUNDLING THE WRONG OF COPYING 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts and scholars today understand and discuss the institution of 
copyright in wholly instrumental terms.1  Indeed, given the forms of 
analysis that they routinely employ, one might be forgiven for thinking 
that copyright is nothing more than a comprehensive government-
administered scheme for encouraging the production of creative ex-
pression and is therefore quite legitimately the subject matter of public 
law.2  While this instrumental focus may have the beneficial effect of 
limiting copyright’s unending expansion, it also serves as a source of 
distraction.  It directs attention away from the reality that copyright is 
fundamentally a creation of the law and is thus endowed with a 
uniquely legal normativity that instrumental accounts find difficult to 
capture.3  In so doing, it also glosses over the rather crucial fact that 
copyright law’s basic structure is and indeed always has been that of 
private law. 
In this Article, I argue that taking copyright’s legal architecture se-
riously reveals a matrix of core private law concepts and ideas that are 
in turn a rich and underappreciated source of normativity for the insti-
tution.  In the process, I make three interrelated claims.  First, copy-
right theories and analyses ought to pay greater attention to the ana-
lytical structure of copyright’s entitlement framework and the ways in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Many thanks to John 
Goldberg, Greg Keating, Mark Lemley, Irene Lu, Jeremy Newman, Gideon Parchomovsky, Henry 
Smith, Ben Zipursky, and the participants at the Harvard Law Review Symposium on The New 
Private Law for helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions.  All errors remain my own. 
 1 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)  
(observing that the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution “is a means by which an  
important public purpose may be achieved” and “is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired”); WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 85–123 (2003) (applying a formal economic model of copyright law to individual copy-
right law doctrines). 
 2 See generally Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004) (describing the 
regulatory turn in copyright law). 
 3 For leading accounts on the idea of legal normativity, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Norma-
tivity of Law, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 3 (1999) and Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private 
Law, 31 O.J.L.S. 215 (2011). 
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which this structure seeks to operate in the real world.  Discussions of 
copyright law would do well to appreciate that the institution’s exclu-
sive rights framework functions almost entirely through its creation of 
an obligation not to copy original expression.  Second, copyright can 
usefully be reconceptualized as revolving around the “wrong of copy-
ing,” which originates in the right-duty structure that copyright cre-
ates.  Reorienting discussions along these lines allows for a more direct 
focus on why copyright treats copying as a wrong, what actions consti-
tute the wrong, and which plural values can fruitfully coexist within 
its private law structure.  Third, focusing on copyright’s internal logic 
need not come at the cost of its instrumentalism.  To the contrary, such 
an approach entails mediating the institution’s instrumentalism 
through its private law structure on a nuanced, pragmatic basis. 
The idea of legal normativity is traced back to the seminal work of 
Professor H.L.A. Hart, who argues that the law always operates by 
imposing “obligations” on individuals.4  Individuals, in turn, comply 
with these obligations not merely because of the consequences of com-
pliance or noncompliance — that is, the rewards or sanctions that are 
likely to follow from obedience or disobedience — but because they 
have internalized the rule and accepted it, owing to its origins in the 
law.  Hart terms this approach to understanding a legal rule the “in-
ternal point of view,” and contrasts it with other approaches that ne-
glect this practical attitude of rule acceptance.5 
Viewing copyright from this internal point of view entails two im-
portant analytical moves.  First, it entails trying to understand copy-
right in terms of its obligatory or duty-imposing directives, which are 
vested with independent normative significance.  Commonly thought 
of entirely in terms of “rights” owing to its structural similarity to 
property law, copyright law is rarely, if ever, conceptualized as a duty-
imposing system.  When scholars do make mention of copyright’s duty 
in their analyses, they do so without crediting this duty with any inde-
pendent functional significance.6  Ironically, though, absent the “duty 
not to copy” that copyright creates as an obligatory directive, copy-
right’s entire structure of exclusive rights becomes functionally vacu-
ous.  Second, an internal approach to copyright law entails accepting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–88 (1961). 
 5 Id. at 86–88 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the In-
ternal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1159–61 (2006) (offering a detailed taxonomy 
of the forms of analysis with which Hart contrasts the internal point of view). 
 6 See generally, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Chal-
lenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Karla 
M. O’Regan, Downloading Personhood: A Hegelian Theory of Copyright Law, 7 CAN. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2009); Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010); Lior Zemer, What Copyright Is: Time to Remember the Basics, 4 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 54 (2006). 
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that copyright’s legal framework — as an obligatory system — speaks 
most directly to potential copiers rather than to creators.  Reframing 
copyright in terms of the “wrong of copying” that its right-duty struc-
ture anticipates provides a more useful basis for tying it to the internal 
point of view. 
It bears emphasizing that in attempting to reorient our understand-
ing of copyright law to focus on the duty that it imposes on actors (that 
is, potential copiers) and on the way in which that duty renders the in-
stitution’s very structure of rights operational, my argument does not 
suggest that the idea of the “duty not to copy” needs to replace any and 
all discussion of “exclusive rights” in copyright law.  I intend instead to 
suggest that while the two always go together, the systematic neglect of 
copyright’s “duties” in copyright jurisprudence and scholarship has 
over time skewed our understanding of copyright’s basic structure as 
an area of law endowed with an obligatory dimension — that is, where 
compliance is required and not merely optional.7  In the process, copy-
right’s very origins as a creation of the law, and as a branch of private 
law, have come to be neglected in discussions of the subject. 
Part I focuses on copyright’s private law edifice to show that much 
of copyright’s analytical work is done through its creation and mainte-
nance of a “duty not to copy,” which it directs at potential copiers, to 
create a “wrong of copying.”  Part II unpacks the wrong of copying, 
shedding some light on its origins, examining the contours of the 
wrongdoing that it identifies, and showing how copyright’s concept of 
copying is a defeasible one that allows the institution to expand se-
quentially.  Part III then examines how a theory of copyright law can 
countenance both obligations and incentives by allowing them to oper-
ate at different levels. 
I.  THE PRIVATE LAW ARCHITECTURE OF COPYRIGHT 
In its instrumental conception, copyright exists in order to provide 
creators with an incentive to produce creative expression.8  This incen-
tive is in turn meant to operate through copyright’s promise of a set of 
“exclusive rights” in relation to the expression, which vest with the 
creator automatically upon creation in a fixed medium of expression 
and endure for a limited period of time.9  Obviously, this conception 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See HART, supra note 4, at 6 (“The most prominent general feature of law at all times and 
places is that its existence means that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but 
in some sense obligatory.”).  For a lucid explanation of this point, see Danny Priel, Sanction and 
Obligation in Hart’s Theory of Law, 21 RATIO JURIS 404 (2008). 
 8 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1573 (2009) (describing the instrumental account); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996). 
 9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (delineating copyright’s exclusive rights). 
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focuses almost completely on the institution of copyright in its capacity 
as an affirmative “grant” of rights.  It locates copyright’s justifica- 
tion — and functioning — entirely in its rights, without so much as al-
luding to the correlative duty that accompanies these rights and the 
constitutive role that it plays in the system.10 
This Part shows that viewing copyright through the lens of private 
law highlights the incompleteness of the dominant instrumental ac-
count, which somewhat myopically understands the institution exclu-
sively in terms of its rights.  When reconceptualized in bipolar  
and correlative terms, under which a plaintiff’s right is coterminous 
with a defendant’s corresponding duty and derives color and content 
from it, copyright law is better understood as revolving around a  
duty — which the law imposes on individuals once a work obtains 
protection — not to copy original expression.  Understanding copy-
right in these terms reveals that the institution’s principal focus — in 
terms of its legal directives — is in reality directed at potential copiers 
and that copyright law functions by creating a wrong of copying. 
A.  Copyright Law and the Duty Not to Copy 
A characteristic feature of private law is the bipolar or plaintiff-
defendant structure of its entitlements.11  Private law entitlements in-
variably entail a direct correspondence between a plaintiff’s right and 
a defendant’s duty, both of which necessarily originate in the same 
normative source and remain incomplete without the other, a feature 
described as their “correlativity.”12  The bipolarity of private law enti-
tlements is of deep functional significance, since it serves to constrain 
the very scope and structure of both the action and the entitlement.  It 
ensures that a plaintiff will seek relief only against a specific defendant 
(rather than the state or society), that a defendant will be ordered to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (defining copyright protection as “the right of the copyright’s 
owner to prevent others from making copies” (emphasis added)). 
 11 PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 12 (1997); JULES L. COLEMAN, THE 
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13–23 (2001) (referring to this concept as private law’s “bilateralism”); 
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63–66 (1995); Hanoch Dagan, The Limited 
Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 809–18 (2008). 
 12 WEINRIB, supra note 11, at 114–44.  The idea of describing the relationship between a right 
and its corresponding duty as a juridical relationship of “correlatives” can be traced back to the 
seminal work of Professor Wesley Hohfeld.  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913); David Lyons, 
The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 NOÛS 45, 47 (1970) (describing the relationship as the 
“doctrine of correlativity”); Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537, 539 (2009) (describ-
ing the relationship as the “correlativity axiom”).  Correlativity is also referred to in other philo-
sophical contexts as “bipolar normativity” or “bipolar deonticity.”  See Michael Thompson, What 
Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND VALUE 333, 338–345 (R. Jay 
Wallace et al. eds., 2004). 
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compensate a specific plaintiff (rather than the collective), and perhaps 
most importantly, that the relief sought and recovery obtained will be 
determined entirely by the parties’ actions rather than by any external 
determinants.13  All of these constraints remain as true in copyright 
law as they do in other parts of private law.14 
Strongly connected to this bipolarity is, of course, copyright’s cor-
relative entitlement structure.  While it is common to speak of copy-
right in terms of the “rights” that it confers on creators, these rights in-
variably correspond (that is, correlate) to a duty that they impose on 
others.  This duty thus forms the “analytic reflex” of the rights in ques-
tion.15  Even though the correlative nature of private law entitlements 
is taken as a given in the world of private law scholarship, it has re-
ceived surprisingly little attention in copyright law.  While a few have 
hinted at copyright’s basic correlativity and the fact that it embodies a 
duty as well as rights, they too have failed to emphasize the analytical 
and functional role played by the duty.16 
Professor Jeremy Waldron was perhaps the first to identify the 
functional and normative importance of duties to the analysis of intel-
lectual property law when he noted that “the point of focusing on du-
ties is more than merely analytic” because “legal duties are hard things 
for people to have — since they constrain conduct and in that sense 
limit freedom.”17  Conceding that “not all the problems of a legal insti-
tution are connected with the duties it imposes,” Waldron nonetheless 
exhorts that “duties are a good place to start, since they will take us to 
whatever hardships are most intimately involved in the immediate 
recognition and enforcement of the rights.”18  This admonition is per-
haps most true of copyright law, and yet copyright law continues to be 
discussed, analyzed, and understood almost entirely in terms of its 
“rights.” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See WEINRIB, supra note 11, at 120–29. 
 14 An anomaly worth noting here is copyright’s provision for statutory damages.  Copyright 
law’s regime of statutory damages was never intended to operate as a punitive measure.  The 
damages prescribed by the statute are thought to represent the approximate actual harm that a 
plaintiff is likely to sustain by virtue of the defendant’s copying and are meant to do no more than 
aid in the process of computation.  See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages 
in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 449 (2009). 
 15 WEINRIB, supra note 11, at 124.  
 16 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at 1392 (noting that copyright contains “an exclusion right 
[that] imposes on the public a duty not to copy”); O’Regan, supra note 6, at 28 (identifying the 
duty in the context of developing a Hegelian account of copyright); Rothman, supra note 6, at 512 
(discussing the duty in the context of advancing a liberty-based approach to copyright); Zemer, 
supra note 6, at 83 (parsing out copyright’s analytical structure to establish that “copyright is a 
form of property”). 
 17 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellec-
tual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 844 (1993).  
 18 Id.  
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While copyright law no doubt confers on creators a set of exclusive 
“rights” in relation to a work, all of these rights revolve around, or re-
main derivative of, copying.  Indeed, what differentiates copyright 
from other forms of property and intellectual property is the fact that 
it does not confer on creators a set of exclusive use privileges, but in-
stead gives them no more than the exclusive right to copy the work,19 
with copying coming to be understood in different ways, reflected in 
the complexity of the rights involved.  Absent a showing of copying, 
there is rarely ever liability for copyright infringement.  Copyright’s 
central right is thus the exclusive right to copy the work, a reality re-
flected in the etymological roots of the word “copyright.”  This focus 
on copying matters because it highlights both the similarity and dis-
similarity between copyright and property, which emphasizes the im-
portance of the duty in copyright law as a functional matter. 
The institution of property is commonly thought of in correlative 
terms.  The owner of a res is said to be vested with a “right to ex-
clude,” which correlates to a duty of forbearance, inviolability, or 
avoidance imposed on the world at large as an in rem duty.20  Yet, in 
property both right and duty remain equally important from a func-
tional standpoint, since they each perform a certain role in relation to 
the institution.  The duty of forbearance, which operates once a re-
source is owned, signals to individuals to avoid interfering with the  
resource without the owner’s authorization.  It thus performs an all-
important coordination function.  While the right to exclude is the ana-
lytic reflex of this duty, it is more than just a placeholder.  Exclusion is 
important in property because it is crucial to, and protects, a set of use 
privileges in relation to the res with which the owner is vested.21  The 
right to exclude, in other words, is a functionally critical feature in the 
traditional property context, since it is necessary for the effective use of 
the res, which is in turn conceived of as scarce and rivalrous in nature.  
Without the ability to exclude — de facto and de jure — all others 
from an apple, its owner would be unable to consume it exclusively.  
Exclusion and the right to exclude perform an important enabling 
function, which relates to the domain of positive use privileges that 
ownership confers upon the owner. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 467 
(2004) (“[C]opyright law prohibits only copying . . . .”). 
 20 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolabil-
ity, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 611, 618 (2008); Hohfeld, supra 
note 12, at 32; J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
724–25 (1996). 
 21 See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 128–30 (1996) (describing property as charac-
terized by a trespassory right that surrounds a set of use privileges); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (2000) (describing exclusion and use as two sides of the same coin). 
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While copyright may seem to be endowed with a similar entitle-
ment structure, the similarity is somewhat deceptive.22  Unlike tradi-
tional property law, which focuses on enabling the “use” of the res, 
copyright law focuses on disabling the copying of the protected expres-
sion.  It thus gives its rightholder the exclusive privilege to copy the 
expression.  Expression, however, remains a perfectly nonrivalrous re-
source, meaning that it can be copied and consumed by multiple actors 
simultaneously without them interfering or competing with one anoth-
er.23  The bare act of copying, for the copyright holder, needs little in-
dependent protection or enabling for it to occur, in contrast to the use 
of a rival resource, which requires protection through exclusion.  It 
would thus make little analytical sense to speak of a “right” to copy, 
since in effect everyone could be endowed with a similar right simul-
taneously.  The key move lies instead in copyright law’s rendering this 
right exclusive.  By vesting the right not just as a bare right but now 
as an exclusive one, copyright law does not just declare that the 
rightholder is allowed to copy, which he could have done even before, 
but instead allows the rightholder to copy to the exclusion of everyone 
else.  And the only way that copyright achieves this exclusion is by 
forbidding all others from copying the expression — for which it relies 
on its correlative, the “duty not to copy.” 
Thus, whereas property law’s “right” actively enables the exclusive 
use of the res and operates within the domain of positive liberty, copy-
right law’s right disables others from copying the expression and oper-
ates as a form of negative liberty.24  It is precisely for this reason that 
copyright’s exclusive right to copy is heavily dependent on its correla-
tive — the duty not to copy — for its disabling function, without 
which the right becomes functionally vacuous.  It is in this sense, then, 
that copyright’s duty not to copy gives operational significance to the 
exclusive right to copy.  Copyright law’s affirmative investiture of a 
right thus functions entirely through its negative divestiture of equiva-
lent and analogous rights from others, for which it relies on the correl-
ative imposition of a duty on all but the creator (that is, the right-
holder).  Waldron was therefore absolutely correct to suggest that for 
intellectual property rights — all of which deal with nonrivalrous re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian 
Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126 (2009) (book review). 
 23 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 36 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 645–
50 (2007) (providing a useful description of copyright law’s reliance on resource nonrivalry). 
 24 Negative freedom by its very nature is freedom from some kind of interference that may be 
brought about by some human agency.  This concept stands in contrast to positive freedom, 
which involves the affirmative conferral of the ability to undertake an action.  SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 61–62 (2011).  This distinction is traditionally traced back to the work of 
Isaiah Berlin.  See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958). 
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sources — we ought to start with the duty in trying to understand the 
structure of the right.25 
Indeed, the centrality and priority of an institution’s obligatory (or 
duty-imposing) dimension was key to Hart’s account of legal rules as 
well.  The “internal aspect of rules” or the “internal point of view,” 
which Hart is credited with developing in The Concept of Law, re-
quires that the normative force of legal rules be appreciated not just in 
terms of the consequences that they are likely to engender, but instead 
from the perspective of those to whom they actually relate and are di-
rected, who in turn “internalize” these rules qua their status as law.26  
Hart further posited that from this point of view, legal rules can be 
understood as being either duty imposing or power conferring in na-
ture.27  The former impose obligations on actors to do or abstain from 
doing certain things, while the latter allow actors to create or alter uni-
laterally these obligations in relation to others.28  Power-conferring 
rules thus provide individuals with a mechanism for altering the norms 
that others are placed under and do so often with the understanding 
that such a change serves important consequentialist purposes. 
Understood in Hart’s terms, then, copyright law can be understood 
as composed of both a power-conferring and a duty-imposing dimen-
sion.  Its grant of exclusive rights remains its power-conferring dimen-
sion: it treats the unilateral act of independently creating original ex-
pression and fixing it in a tangible medium as altering everyone else’s 
normative position by imposing a legal duty on others not to copy the 
expression.  Additionally, power-conferring rules have been traditional-
ly understood as existing to provide certain actors with a consequen-
tialist reason for their actions.  Professor Joseph Raz identifies an es-
sential component of such unilateral power-conferring rules to be that: 
[T]he law’s reasons for acknowledging that it effects a legal change is that 
it is of a type such that it is reasonable to expect that actions of that type 
will, if they are recognized to have certain legal consequences, standard- 
ly be performed only if the person concerned wants to secure these legal  
consequences.29  
In other words, a hallmark of power-conferring rules is that they 
exist in order to induce and enable actions that trigger the normative 
change in question.30  Independent, original creation triggers a particu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Waldron, supra note 17, at 844. 
 26 HART, supra note 4, at 56–57, 88–89. 
 27 Id. at 26–49. 
 28 Id. at 80–81 (observing how power-conferring rules lead “to the creation or variation of du-
ties or obligations”). 
 29 Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers II, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y 79, 81 (1972) (emphasis added).  
 30 See Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1741–42 (2008) (“First, the law must be designed in a way that underwrites 
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lar legal consequence (namely the imposition of an obligation on oth-
ers), and in this power-conferring dimension, copyright can be seen as 
working to induce the production of original expression. 
Conversely, copyright’s duty-imposing dimension relates to the ob-
ligations it imposes on others when its operation is triggered.  The act 
of creation enables the actor to trigger a certain legal consequence, yet 
the mechanics of that consequence, as we have seen, emanate from the 
obligation imposed on others through the duty not to copy.  The struc-
ture of copyright law thus embodies both duty-imposing and power-
conferring aspects.31  It should be fairly apparent from this discussion 
that the inducement of creativity — the instrumental account — fo-
cuses on its power-conferring dimension, since it assumes that the pos-
sibility of invoking copyright’s exclusive rights framework induces cre-
ative expression. 
The instrumental account of copyright, while not wrong in looking 
at copyright’s power-conferring dimension, says nothing at all about 
copyright’s duty-imposing dimension.  And indeed, this account views 
the duty-imposing dimension as largely contingent, in the sense that 
the precise structure and content of that duty matters less than its 
nominal existence and availability.  Interestingly enough, though, Hart 
regarded power-conferring rules as “parasitic” on the primary duty-
creating ones, which to him formed the core normative content of a le-
gal system.32  The power-conferring dimension thus always relates to 
logically prior primary obligations that the legal system empowers ac-
tors to create or alter.33  In other words, the normative significance of 
the power conferral derives from the consequences that its invocation 
entails — that is, the duty that it imposes.  To Hart, then, power-
conferring rules could never be understood and appreciated indepen-
dent of duty-imposing ones, even if the opposite could hold true.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
an expectation of its purposive use — an expectation that persons will satisfy the law for the sake 
of the legal consequences.  Second, that expectation must be the law’s reason for attaching those 
legal consequences to acts of that type.”). 
 31 Building on Hart’s categories, Professor Gregory Klass has in recent work suggested that 
some laws operate as hybrids between these two types of rules — as “compound rules” — and 
create both duties and powers.  See id. at 1730–31.  Such compound rules differ from traditional 
power-conferring ones in that they are never premised on an actor’s showing of legal purpose (for 
example, legal formalities), but instead assume “that a significant proportion of actors subject to 
[the rule] are likely to have such a purpose and recognize[] and facilitate[] that purposive use.”  Id. 
at 1730.  With copyright law’s abandonment of formalities one might thus argue that copyright 
law, much like contract law, consists of such “compound rules.”  While it does not require creators 
to indicate their intent to assert exclusivity and place others under a corresponding obligation, 
copyright law readily presumes that most producers of original expression are likely to have that 
purpose in mind.  
 32 HART, supra note 4, at 81 (“[Power-conferring rules] are in a sense parasitic upon or second-
ary to [duty-imposing rules] . . . .”). 
 33 Id.  
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Whether or not Hart’s strong claim holds true for copyright, at the 
very least it suggests that the duty-imposing dimension ought to re-
ceive a more prominent treatment in copyright jurisprudence and 
thinking. 
No less a realist (and avowed consequentialist) than Justice 
Holmes34 also readily thought of copyright as a duty-imposing legal 
regime.  In his concurrence in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co.,35 an opinion otherwise characterized by its brevity, Jus- 
tice Holmes went through the trouble of describing what he thought 
copyright law was all about.  His observations in this regard are quite 
telling: 
The right to exclude [in copyright] is not directed to an object in posses-
sion or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak.  It restrains the spontaneity of 
men where but for it there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their 
doing as they saw fit.  It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the per-
sons or tangibles of the party having the right.  It may be infringed a 
thousand miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of 
the wrong.36 
While Justice Holmes never used the word “duty” to describe copy-
right, he was clearly conceptualizing copyright’s “right” entirely in 
terms of the obligations (that is, the restraints, prohibitions, and re-
strictions) that it imposes on others.37  Copyright law was thus to Jus-
tice Holmes about the duty not to copy original expression, no more 
and no less. 
Commencing the analysis of copyright law with the duty not to 
copy as a functional and normative matter need not detract from the 
basic correlativity of the entitlement as an analytical matter.  Accept-
ing copyright’s correlative structure would thus involve no more than 
recognizing that the institution’s “rights” are functionally negative in 
character, in that they involve an “abstention[], forbearance[], or non-
interference” on the part of others.38  They are thus in some sense the 
bases of claims against the doing of a certain act — that is, copying — 
which in turn inform the claimant’s own claim to do that same act 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 See Harry W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. 
REV. 799, 799 (1961) (describing Justice Holmes as “the hero figure of the realist clan”). 
 35 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 36 Id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring) (emphases added). 
 37 Somewhat ironically, in the world of tort law, Justice Holmes was known to be a duty skep-
tic, believing that the idea of a “duty” in law was devoid of normative significance and operated 
as little more than a prediction of likely legal consequences.  See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COM-
MON LAW 144 (1881); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897); see 
also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of 
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1566–76 (2006) (elaborating 
on Justice Holmes’s duty skepticism and discussing Hart’s critique of it). 
 38 Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 137, 139 (1966).  
  
1674 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1664 
 
himself.39  Indeed, even as a mere analytic reflex, the right serves the 
purpose of forming an important focal point for the alienability of the 
entitlement.  All the same, beginning our understanding of the institu-
tion from the duty — instead of the right — sheds important light on 
the functioning of copyright.  Copyright law can thus be seen to per-
form an important “guidance” function, independent of and in addition 
to any potential incentive it may provide to creators.40  Copyright, in 
other words, comes to be conceptualized as a system that individuals 
in society need, by default, to navigate through (or around) when going 
about their everyday activities — much like most other obligatory ar-
eas of the law. 
B.  From the Duty Not to Copy to the Wrong of Copying 
In the preceding paragraphs, I have argued that paying closer at-
tention to copyright law’s analytical framework as a private law insti-
tution reveals a commitment to a correlative entitlement structure con-
sisting of an “exclusive right to copy” and a “duty not to copy,” with 
the former deriving its functional significance from the latter.  Bring-
ing direct attention to copyright’s duty highlights the fact that the law 
speaks not just to creators but also — and perhaps more directly — to 
potential copiers.  In establishing a set of exclusive rights and vesting 
it in a creator, copyright communicates a relational legal directive to 
potential copiers, to the effect that copying expression original to an-
other can result in liability.41  Despite its statutory origins, then, copy-
right’s legal directive mirrors other directives in the common law 
structurally, by identifying both an action and an agent in relation to 
whom the action can trigger liability, a feature often described as the 
“dyadic” or transitive nature of relational legal directives.42  A breach 
of the duty as embodied in the directive is treated as an infraction of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 For the distinction between “rights” and “claims,” see Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value 
of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 249–57 (1970), observing that “[t]o have a right is to have a 
claim against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing rules or 
moral principles.”  Id. at 257. 
 40 Cf. Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 
83 VA. L. REV. 837, 858 (1997). 
 41 It is perhaps at this point that Justice Holmes’s understanding of duties in nonrelational 
terms finds its place in his opinion in White-Smith.  209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).  In 
observing that copyright contains an abstract prohibition detached from person or res, he seemed 
to be suggesting that it operated as a simple legal directive not to copy.  See id. at 19–20.  Yet, as 
an analytical matter, copying is wrong only when the subject matter is copyrighted, a process that 
always necessitates a human agent in whom a right comes to vest. 
 42 For fuller accounts of relational legal directives in tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg & Ben-
jamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 744 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse]; and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1998). 
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the right, and since both right and duty revolve around the act of  
copying, the inquiry focuses on the nature and consequences of this 
act.  All of these observations indelibly point to copyright’s core nor-
mative structure mapping onto that of tort law, the law of civil 
wrongs, through its creation of a wrong of copying. 
In its simplest form, a “wrong” is understood as an actor’s breach 
of a duty imposed on him or her.43  Legal wrongs have thus been de-
fined as constituting a simple breach of a duty imposed by law, no 
more and no less.44  Understood in this sense, characterizing an action 
as constituting a legal wrong does not ipso facto entail any moral dis-
approbation of the action.  If copyright begins with the imposition of a 
duty (not to copy) on everyone other than the creator, why then is the 
law of copyright not more appropriately understood (and analyzed) in 
terms of the breach of this duty, and the wrong that it engenders — 
that is, as the law of “copywrongs”? 
The failure to conceptualize copyright law in terms of the wrong 
that it creates might be understood in terms of the idea of direct reali-
zation, made famous by Professor Peter Birks in his fourfold classifica-
tion of the common law.45  Noting that while almost all common law 
actions can in theory be understood as deriving from breaches of du-
ties (that is, from wrongs), Birks claimed that the reason that some are 
rarely ever described and classified as such relates to the possibility of 
their being understood in terms of causative events that are logically 
and temporally antecedent to the wrong, which in turn generate rights 
“directly realizable in the courts.”46  Thus, contract law is rarely un-
derstood exclusively in terms of the “wrong” of breach of contract, 
even though in theory every action for breach must derive from such a 
wrong, because the consensual act of contracting generates primary 
obligations that courts often enforce directly, through specific perfor-
mance.47  This understanding contrasts with that of tort law, where 
the antecedent rights and events are both diffuse and nascent, necessi-
tating a duty- (and wrong-) based characterization when courts “con-
ceptualize the immediate reason for their intervention.”48  In a similar 
vein, one might thus argue that in copyright, the primary right and du-
ty (that is, the exclusive right to copy and its correlative duty not to 
copy) preexist any invasion or act on the part of the defendant — an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW 29, 37 (David G. Owen ed., 1997). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 O.J.L.S. 1, 27 (2000). 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.; see also ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 320–25 (2007) (observing that tort 
law is parasitic on rights created elsewhere). 
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argument that explains why copyright is not dependent on the idea of 
a wrong for conceptualization.  On closer analysis, however, this rea-
soning is somewhat suspect. 
It is certainly true that a creator’s act of creating an original work 
of expression quite independently generates a duty and a correlative 
right as part of the entitlement.  Yet a peculiar feature of both the 
right and the duty so triggered is that, structurally, they always antici-
pate an infraction, without which (or indeed without the possibility of 
which) the entitlement becomes wholly unnecessary, given the 
nonrivalrous nature of the intangible — that is, of original expres-
sion.49  Copyright’s “exclusive right” to copy is, in effect, the right to 
have others not copy the work in question.  This understanding con-
trasts with that of tangible property, where the ownership interest per-
forms an important coordination function independent of anticipating 
an infraction and can thus be understood as generating primary rights 
that are directly enforceable.  Nowhere is this idea clearer than in the 
law of trespass to chattels, where the law disallows an action unless 
actual physical harm to the chattel or an interference with possession 
is established.50  Nonetheless, the disallowance of the action has no 
bearing on the validity (or existence) of the owner’s interest in the 
property, in terms of the other exclusive use privileges that accompany 
such ownership.  The owner continues to have sole agenda-setting  
authority over the res even in the absence of a functional right to  
exclude. 
Taking copyright’s structure seriously as a legal institution — by 
which I mean an institution that owes its origins entirely to positive 
law — thus entails focusing on its obligatory structure, which is about 
the imposition on actors of a legal duty not to copy.  The institution 
therefore remains structured around the potential or actual breach  
of this duty — a wrong — for which it allows a mechanism of redress 
in the nature of an action for infringement.  Analyzing copyright law 
in terms of the “wrong of copying” is thus neither superfluous nor  
optional but indeed demanded by the institution’s core analytical 
structure. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 This peculiar structure also contrasts with that of the law of unjust enrichment, which 
Birks tries to distinguish from the law of wrongs on the grounds that the original act (modeled on 
mistaken payment) independently generates a restitutionary right, which courts directly enforce.  
Birks, supra note 45, at 28.  In unjust enrichment, however, neither right (to recover the payment) 
nor duty (to return the payment) anticipates an infraction, since they are couched in affirmative 
rather than negative terms. 
 50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965).  See generally 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels and the Anglo-
American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 135 (2006). 
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II.  UNPACKING THE WRONG OF COPYING 
Part I argued that copyright’s analytical structure — when under-
stood from an internal point of view — lies in its creation of a wrong 
of copying.  This Part moves to unbundling the normative structure of 
this wrong, centered on the act of expressive copying.  First, this Part 
looks to the source of the “wrong” and examines how a wrong-based 
approach allows copying to be understood as a legal wrong, a purely 
instrumental one, or indeed one influenced by morality.  Second, it an-
alyzes the type of conduct to which the law directs itself — namely, 
copying — to get at the notions of wrongdoing and the wrongfulness 
with which copyright is concerned.  Third, it shows how the wrong of 
copying operates as a generative idea around which different values 
and devices in copyright coalesce. 
A.  Why is Copying Wrong? 
Attempts to justify the institution of copyright abound in the litera-
ture and, roughly speaking, can be classified into instrumental theories, 
which focus on copyright’s effect on creativity, and deontic theories, 
which focus on the connection between an author and his or her crea-
tive expression.51  Understanding copyright law in terms of the “wrong 
of copying,” however, adds a new and hitherto underexplored dimen-
sion to this justificatory endeavor.  Most justifications offered for copy-
right law begin with the assumption that its analytical framework is 
limited to that of its “rights.”  They thereafter proceed to do no more 
than look for an affirmative source for these rights and for actions or 
theories that serve to vest such rights in actors.52  Almost never are 
copyright’s duties independently justified.  If we instead begin with 
the understanding that copyright law’s core work is done by its “duty 
not to copy” coupled with its concomitant treatment of copying as a 
wrong, the search for a justification assumes a very different color.  
Stand-alone justificatory theories — such as labor- and personality-
based ones — become unnecessary (and to some degree redundant), 
since they say nothing about the act of copying (which the duty pro-
scribes) and why it ought to be treated as a wrong, other than de-
scribing it as an act of appropriation, which is then translated into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 See generally, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY (2010); 
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007); 
Gordon, supra note 6; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Author-
ship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Landes & Posner, supra note 10; Netanel, supra note 8; Barbara 
Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994). 
 52 See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 
(1996) (inquiring “[w]hy give authors an exclusive right to their writings?” (emphasis added)). 
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property- and ownership-centric ideas.53  Instead, the justification 
must provide some account of why copying is perceived by the law as 
wrongful and accordingly condemned.  It must, in other words, root its 
“vestitive” account of copyright’s “rights” in the normativity of the in-
stitution’s core analytical apparatus — its creation of a wrong.54 
Within the world of civil wrongs — the law of torts — scholars 
continue to disagree about the extent to which the law’s condemnation 
of a certain act as a private wrong embodies a moral dimension.  On 
one view, the idea of a wrong does embody a moral aspect.  This mor-
al element is reflected either in the recognition that an individual is a 
moral agent and therefore responsible for an action and its conse-
quences on others, or in a morality embodied in the relationship be-
tween a plaintiff’s right and a defendant’s duty.55  On another view, 
made famous by Justice Holmes, rights and duties (and therefore 
wrongs) in the law have no moral element whatsoever in them and 
merely predict certain legal consequences that are likely to follow from 
antecedent actions.56  Justice Holmes’s argument has in more recent 
times given rise to the view that tort law’s rights and duties — and in-
fractions of them — are to be understood not just in terms of their 
immediate legal consequences but also in terms of their instrumental 
effects on society at large — that is, as a means of risk-spreading57 or 
deterrence.58  On yet another view, while the law of wrongs can relate 
to actions that are also morally wrong, they need not do so all the time.  
On this view, legal wrongs embody their own normativity, which is 
hermeneutically independent of morality.59 
While the debate about the interface between law and morality 
may remain inconclusive, it nonetheless points to different ways of un-
derstanding the normative foundations of copyright’s reliance on the 
wrong of copying without having to locate the institution’s justifica-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 For an excellent overview of this process, see MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 
204–37 (2010).  
 54 See JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 303 (2d ed. 1907) (noting that there can never 
be “any right without a basis of fact in which it has its root and from which it proceeds”); Richard 
A. Epstein, The Not So Minimum Content of Natural Law, 25 O.J.L.S. 219, 233 (2005) (“[W]hat 
lawyers do in practice is develop first a system of wrongs from which it is then possible to infer 
the outlines of an underlying system of rights.” (emphasis added)).  
 55 See TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 69–70 (1999); Avihay Dorfman, Can 
Tort Law Be Moral?, 23 RATIO JURIS 205, 205–06 (2010); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Founda-
tions of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 478–79 (1992). 
 56 Holmes, supra note 37, at 458. 
 57 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961). 
 58 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972); Gary T. 
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 377, 378 (1994). 
 59 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 42, at 930–32. 
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tion in notions of labor, desert, personality, or ownership.  Each side of 
the debate offers us a different way of thinking about copyright law’s 
treatment of copying as a wrong. 
1.  Morality. — From a deontic perspective,60 copyright law treats 
copying as a wrong because copying original expression remains an  
independent moral wrong.  Copying is morally wrong not because it 
operates as an infraction of an ownership or property interest, but be-
cause it directly interferes with an individual’s ability to perform a 
speech act (that is, expression) and communicate with the public as 
speaker.61  Kant is known to have made this argument very early on 
and, in the process, consciously distanced copyright law from the idea 
of property in order to establish the wrongfulness of unauthorized pub-
lication.62  This view is particularly powerful in explaining why copy-
right law, unlike other types of intellectual property law such as patent 
law, insists on a showing that the defendant copied protected expres-
sion from the plaintiff’s work, thereby emphasizing that the individu-
ality of a speech act is protectable only against direct interferences and 
not in the abstract. 
2.  Deterrence. — Adopting a purely instrumental view of wrongs, 
one could argue that copyright law treats copying as a wrong because 
of its detrimental effects on creativity.  In this conception, expressive 
copying is thought to diminish a creator’s ability to exploit the market 
for original expression, and copyright’s liability regime operates as a 
deterrent against such copying through its threat of monetary sanc-
tions.63  By deterring such copying, copyright law in turn preserves 
creators’ incentives to produce more creative expression.  The law 
treats copying as a wrong in this view only because of the law’s com-
mitment to inducing creativity by deterring copying.  It is important to 
note how this particular instrumental approach differs from the stan-
dard inducement-through-rights approach encountered earlier.  
Whereas the previous account focused on copyright’s power-conferring 
dimension, the deterrence-based account operates firmly within the in-
stitution’s duty-imposing side.  Additionally, this approach is far more 
modest about the connection between copyright law and creative in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 By “deontic perspective,” I mean the perspective that concerns moral obligations. 
 61 See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 23, 30, 33 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
 62 Id. at 29; see also ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 95 n.13 (2009).  For a more 
recent extension of this theory, see Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled 
Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Anna-
belle Lever ed., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3–4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1954858 (describing all copyright infringement as involving a speech 
act). 
 63 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 346 (describing copyright’s economic rationale as the 
prevention of “free-riding”). 
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ducement, since it posits merely that by treating copying as a wrong, 
copyright law preserves the incentive to create, which may be consti-
tuted through different sources.  This account is unlike the previous 
account, which claimed that copyright law was constitutive of the in-
centive to create.64 
3.  Positivism. — A third view might point to copyright law’s nor-
mativity having an existence independent of both any underlying mo-
rality and any instrumental goals.  In this view, copyright’s reliance on 
copying as a private legal wrong is best understood in terms of the 
way in which the institution treats copying in practice.  Here, copy-
right’s condemnation of copying is best understood in pragmatic, posi-
tivist terms, as the law’s provision for a mechanism of recourse, which, 
when availed of by a creator, entitles him or her to some redress.65  
Copying, in other words, is wrong because it interferes with an indi-
vidual’s interest that is important enough to merit legal protection.  
The reasons for such importance may be either completely internal to 
the individual (for example, morality), external to the individual (for 
example, social welfare), or some mix of the two.  Yet what matters is 
the law’s recognition of the wrong of copying — no more, no less.66 
This outline of justifications for the wrong of copying suggests that 
there is not one clear answer to the question of why copyright law 
treats copying as a wrong.  Indeed, each of them has obvious short-
comings and deficiencies.  The moral view, for instance, relies on treat-
ing protectable expression as a speech act.  Yet the expression covered 
by copyright law today may not be limited to speech in the same 
communicative sense as before, seen in examples such as computer 
software code.  The deterrence-based account of incentives, much like 
deterrence accounts in tort law, is hard-pressed to explain why the pe-
culiar bipolar arrangement of private law should be the ideal vehicle 
for deterrence, as opposed to, for example, criminal law.  The con-
straint of bipolarity here seems more like a cost than a benefit.  The 
positivist account in turn seems to need a logically prior identification 
of an individual “interest” for its completeness.  Scholars using this ap-
proach in the law of torts typically fall back on property as a norma-
tive idea to serve as the interest in question.67  Yet this outsourcing as-
sumes away (or at best recasts) the problem, for it simplistically treats 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 The Supreme Court’s observation that “[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” am-
ply supports this theory.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
 65 Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 42, at 734–35 (describing the tort system’s provision 
of a method of redress for wronged plaintiffs and setting out the idea of a right of recourse). 
 66 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 42, at 937–38. 
 67 See, e.g., id. at 938.  
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property as an explanatory rather than justificatory device.68  To be 
sure, the three accounts offered here are simplified versions of these 
theories, and the deficiencies identified can perhaps be corrected 
through suitable alterations, an examination of which is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
My objective in offering these three possible ways of approaching 
the normative question of why copying is wrong is primarily structural 
rather than substantive.  First, it reveals that the purely instrumental 
account becomes one of several plausible theories for the institution.  
To date, owing to the rights-centric approach to analyzing the institu-
tion, the only viable alternatives to the standard utilitarian theories 
that scholars have even considered are those analogous to the droit 
d’auteur regimes of civil law jurisdictions — where the author’s status 
as creator is taken to automatically justify an innate personal right, 
natural in origin and independent of the state.69  Given the U.S. Con-
stitution’s distinctively utilitarian description of copyright law,70 cou-
pled with Anglo-American law’s rejection of the civil law model of 
droit d’auteur, the instrumental justification of copyright law has 
seemed to many to be an unavoidable default.71  Reconceptualizing 
copyright law in terms of the wrong of copying, however, reveals that 
this default need not be inevitable, and that the justifications for copy-
right law can indeed invoke a wider array of sources as long as they 
connect to “copying,” the core act that the institution regulates.  Se-
cond, approaching the justificatory endeavor from the perspective of a 
wrong rather than a right allows for the various theories to blend to-
gether pragmatically and supplement each other as needed.  In other 
words, it avoids a basic essentialism (or fundamentalism) that accom-
panies most discussions of rights.72  Thus, in tort law, scholars have 
long sought to justify the idea of a wrong by invoking elements from 
different theories that may seem incompatible in the abstract to devel-
op what some have referred to as “mixed theories.”73  Copyright might 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 Cf. Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
138, 144–45 (1999) (making this point in relation to corrective justice theories).  
 69 See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (1978); Jane C. Ginsburg, A 
Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 
991, 992 (1990); Rudolf Monta, The Concept of “Copyright” Versus the “Droit D’Auteur,” 32 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 177, 178 (1959). 
 70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).   
 71 But see Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 996 (“A copyright regime’s initial instrumentalist formu-
lation does not preclude later reception of more personalist notions of protection.”).  
 72 This idea is famously captured in the phrase “rights as trumps.”  Ronald Dworkin, Rights as 
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152, 164 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 
 73 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Correc-
tive Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1815 (1997).  
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indeed demand a similar approach, which a wrong-based conception 
of the institution readily facilitates.74 
B.  Copying as Wrongdoing 
Reorienting copyright law around the wrong of copying obviously 
entails identifying the contours of the wrongdoing that triggers poten-
tial liability.  While copyright law emphasizes that copying is required 
for liability, it remains equally true that “[n]ot all copying . . . [consti-
tutes] copyright infringement.”75  The range of copying around which 
liability is centered — and which forms the basis of the “duty not to 
copy” — is thus heavily circumscribed by the law. 
Copyright law renders the copying of original expression actionable 
as a wrong quite independent of any actual fault by the copier.76  It 
thus makes little difference for liability whether the copying was inten-
tional, negligent, or a genuine mistake, though fault can affect the 
court’s computation of damages.77  The wrong of copying is thus one 
of “strict liability.”78  Strict liability is ordinarily thought to be either 
conduct-based or harm-based, depending on the law’s choice of trig-
gering event for liability.79  Copying, however, sits somewhat oddly in 
this scheme.  While liability for copying is not harm-based in the sense 
that an affirmative showing of harm caused by the copying is not a 
precondition for liability, the law does not content itself with merely an 
analysis of the defendant’s conduct, either.  Its structure of wrongdoing 
is best described as one of result-through-conduct.  While the law re-
quires the act of copying to trigger liability, such copying is rendered 
actionable only when it results in the creation of a “substantially simi-
lar” copy of the original expression — a standard that encompasses 
both qualitative and quantitative dimensions.80  Copyright thus im-
poses on individuals an obligation not to produce a substantially simi-
lar copy of the original work through the act of reproduction (that is, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 One might worry that the very characterization of copying as a wrong somehow privileges a 
moral theory for the institution.  Recognizing and emphasizing that the wrong being identified is 
a “legal wrong” might go some distance toward alleviating this concern.  Just as discussions of 
copyright’s “rights” are today understood in positivist terms, so too — hopefully — will the idea 
of the wrong of copying. 
 75 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 76 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
 77 Id. § 504(c) (granting courts the ability to assess higher penalties against intentional  
violators). 
 78 Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 351, 351 (2002) (noting that liability in copyright law is strict and that “the infringer’s 
faultlessness or culpability is of anomalously little relevance”). 
 79 See Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 5 J. TORT L. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 7 n.20), available at http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art134. 
 80 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN  
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (2011).  
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copying).  Neither the bare act of reproduction nor the mere produc-
tion of a substantially similar work is sufficient to trigger liability 
without the other.81 
Unsurprisingly, courts have struggled to come to terms with the 
unique result-through-conduct structure of copying as a wrong.  Rec-
ognizing the difficulty inherent in proving the conduct element of the 
wrong through direct evidence, courts rely on evidence of “access” to 
the original work and the similarity between the works to infer the ex-
istence of copying.82  Most courts, however, either employ an unduly 
broad understanding of access or use what is known as the “inverse ra-
tio” approach,83 under which independent proof of access becomes less 
relevant when the works are exceedingly similar.84  Such similarity is 
thought to allow an inference of access — and therefore of copying — 
as a rule of res ipsa loquitur.85  In practice, this approach places an in-
surmountable burden on a defendant and over time has caused courts 
and parties to pay scant attention to the conduct dimension of copying.  
To make things worse, courts routinely conflate the conduct and result 
dimensions of the wrongdoing because of their extensive reliance on 
inferences to satisfy the former.86  Many courts mistakenly apply the 
inverse ratio approach not just to the act of copying, but to its result as 
well — that is, to their analysis of substantial similarity — without 
recognizing the analytical independence of the two.87 
The result dimension of the inquiry is more than just a formality.  
In examining whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in a “substan-
tially similar” copy of the plaintiff’s work, the law is not looking mere-
ly for some similarity between the works.  Rather, the substantial simi-
larity analysis entails examining whether the copy reproduced material 
of value and substance, or the essence of the work.88  Once again, this 
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 81 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] 
(2011).  
 82 See, e.g., Mag Jewelry Co. v. Cherokee, Inc., 496 F.3d 108, 117–19 (1st Cir. 2007); Selle v. 
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 83 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03[D]. 
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also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing that when 
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 85 See Ty, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1170 (discussing the inference that one may draw regarding copy-
ing).  See generally Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 
519 (1934); William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241 
(1936). 
 86 For a description of this confusion and an attempt to eliminate it, see Alan Latman, “Proba-
tive Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).  
 87 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  
 88 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 80, § 2:4. 
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requirement relates to the intersubjective dimension of the copyright 
entitlement, since it emphasizes the defendant’s reproduction of the 
part of the work that is most closely connected to the creator in an ob-
jective sense.89 
Copyright law’s focus on “copying” thus remains an unappreciated 
source of normativity and analytical nuance, which instrumental ac-
counts of the institution gloss over or view as contingent.  
Reconceptualizing copyright as a wrong-based institution is likely to 
go some distance in reversing this shortcoming. 
C.  The Defeasible Structure of Copying 
Viewing copyright law through the lens of copying also illuminates 
its procedural structure, which is of deep substantive relevance.  At its 
simplest, copyright law treats copying, in both its conduct and result 
dimensions, as a defeasible wrong, and therefore as creating a pre-
sumption of liability that is subject to defenses and rebuttals.  The 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing facts sufficient to raise this 
presumption — that is, the prima facie case.90  As with the common 
law’s treatment of strict liability, the defendant in a copyright suit then 
has three options: (i) denying the truth of the allegation, (ii) questioning 
its legal sufficiency, or (iii) seeking to avoid liability by introducing a 
new consideration.91  These alternatives in turn introduce important 
substantive dimensions in the copyright adjudication. 
In denying the truth of the allegation, the defendant effectively as-
serts that there was no copying, in the conduct sense of the term.  The 
defendant thus avers that the copy was independently created.  In 
questioning the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegation, the de-
fendant’s argument focuses on the result of the copying, to show that it 
was not “substantial” enough (or wrongful), in either the qualitative or 
quantitative sense.  In making this claim, however, the defendant can 
introduce several of copyright’s substantive criteria into the inquiry, 
such as originality, the idea-expression dichotomy, the scènes-à-faire 
exception, and the like.92  In exercising either of these options (that is, 
denial and sufficiency), the defendant is always responding to the 
plaintiff’s averments. 
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 89 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 37–45), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2014395. 
 90 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.01 (describing the elements for which the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proof). 
 91 See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 567–68 (1973) 
(describing the common law’s system of pleading defenses in response to a prima facie case).  
 92 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03[B]. 
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Copyright law’s principal mechanism for defendants to introduce 
“new” considerations into the equation to avoid liability is the fair use 
doctrine.93  And it is through the fair use question that the wrong of 
copying comes to address the question of harm, since a fair use defense 
in effect alleges that the defendant’s actions did not cause the plaintiff 
any cognizable harm.94  While fair use has expanded dramatically 
since its inception and now extends to elements that are not strictly 
harm-based, at its very core, fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” 
was and is meant to be about the absence of actual or potential harm 
from the defendant’s act of copying.95  In treating copying as a  
wrong, copyright law thus does not altogether ignore the question of 
harm.  Rather, it relegates harm to a tertiary position after conduct 
and result — which together are thought to lead to a presumption of 
harm.  The defendant can then rebut that presumption by showing 
that the copying was in fact harmless. 
Copying is thus structured as a defeasible legal wrong96 in that it 
contains an embedded “unless circumstances demand otherwise” con-
dition for liability — a condition manifested most clearly in the fair 
use doctrine.  It is important to note that this defeasibility operates bi-
laterally, with the defendant’s new allegations remaining just as defea-
sible by the plaintiff as were the plaintiff’s original claims in the prima 
facie case.  The plaintiff can deny, demur, or avoid in response to the 
defendant’s allegations.  In this way, the system comes to accommo-
date a host of considerations related to and independent of copying as 
such, and in the process expands outward beyond a concern with just 
the wrong of copying.97  
The defeasible nature of copying thus also points to its generativity, 
which in turn has two important implications.  First, it allows for a 
significant degree of value pluralism to enter into the functioning of 
copyright law.  The defeasible structure of the inquiry effectively se-
quences the introduction of various considerations at each stage of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  For a recent account of the doctrine and its evolution, see PATRICIA 
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 94 See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 991–1002 (2007) (arguing that several leading Supreme Court fair use 
opinions reveal a concern with the idea of harm). 
 95 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1974), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659, 5679; see also 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
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adjudication — thereby allowing courts to consider them independent-
ly without having to weigh them and trade them off against each other 
directly.98  The cumulative legality of copying is thus determined in a 
sequential, pragmatic, and case-by-case manner.  Second, the inde-
pendent generativity of copying as a legal concept allows copyright 
law’s core architecture to remain constant across subject matter and 
medium.  Copyright law has expanded quite dramatically since its ori-
gins in the publishing industry and today covers a host of expressive 
products that have little resemblance to published books.99  What has 
indeed permitted copyright law to expand in this manner is the reality 
that its minimal content has at all times maintained its focus on the 
wrong of copying original expression.  Making copying its point of 
emphasis for different kinds of expression has allowed the institution 
to incrementally develop a host of add-on considerations suited to the 
peculiarities of the subject matter in question (for example, computer 
programs).  The wrong of copying — not commodification — thus 
forms copyright’s common analytical core. 
The defeasibility and generativity of copying as a concept is illus-
trated in the figure below, which shows its layered nature: as a legal 
concept, its constituent conceptual elements, their translation into legal 
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––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 98 Cf. Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Toward a Reasonable Accommo-
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(showing how the defeasible structure of tort law contributes to its value pluralism). 
 99 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (describing the subject matter of copyright). 
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III.  OBLIGATIONS AND INCENTIVES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
The discussion thus far has endeavored to establish that copyright 
law can fruitfully be understood as revolving around a correlative enti-
tlement whose obligatory structure imposes the “duty not to copy” on 
potential copiers.  At the very outset, however, I noted that this ac-
count should not be seen as incompatible with the traditional utilitari-
an, instrumentalist account of copyright, but instead should be seen as 
rendering that account more complete.  In this Part, I suggest how the 
two can be reconciled. 
The incompleteness of the instrumental account derives from its 
treatment of copyright’s legal apparatus as less than integral to what 
copyright as an institution is.  The instrumental account focuses on the 
message that copyright law sends to potential creators, in terms of its 
promise of exclusive rights in return for creative expression.  Addition-
ally, its emphasis on the alienability of these rights readily directs at-
tention to the market-based incentive that this provides for creators.  
Viewed from the narrow perspective of creators and their exclusive 
rights, copyright law must of necessity be seen as optional, since crea-
tors are at liberty to reject what copyright has to offer them; just as 
with other power-conferring rules, actors remain at liberty not to in-
voke the conferral of power.100  Refuting the validity of this account of 
copyright law as an optional legal regime for inducing creativity is 
thus an entirely empirical matter. 
To the instrumental account, the precise structure of copyright’s en-
titlement — that is, its “rights” — matters very little.  The inducement 
for creativity that it seeks to provide could thus be meaningfully 
achieved in principle through the grant of a government-sponsored 
subsidy or reward, a tax break, or perhaps more realistically, a com-
pensation (or compulsory licensing) regime.101  The instrumental ac-
count thus lacks explanatory depth, in that it does not extend beyond 
the surface of copyright’s operation to explain why it operates in the 
precise way that it does — namely, as a correlative entitlement. 
Viewing copyright law as a branch of private law, however, enables 
us to look beyond the institution’s optional nature to see that a large 
part of its functioning is instead obligatory — a hallmark of any legal 
regime.102  Especially since copyright law offers original expression 
protection by default, meaning that a creator is by default assumed to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 See Klass, supra note 30, at 1730. 
 101 See Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 121, 134–36 
(documenting alternatives to copyright and noting that the current system is not socially optimal). 
 102 See HART, supra note 4, at 6. 
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have invoked the power so conferred,103 the obligatory dimension re-
mains both functionally salient and normatively significant. 
The optional (instrumental) and obligatory (intrinsic or duty-based) 
accounts might be rendered compatible if they are seen to be operating 
at different levels of analysis, which accounts for their focus on differ-
ent participants in the system.  The process of justification can thus be 
parsed into two independent steps, which in turn allow seemingly in-
compatible values to coexist.  This process can be traced back to Pro-
fessor John Rawls’s distinction between “justifying a practice” and 
“justifying a particular action falling under it.”104  The first step in-
volves justifying the existence of an institution in society, while the se-
cond involves justifying the particular working content of that institu-
tion, once brought into existence.105  These steps in turn track the 
distinction seen in Rawls’s theory between a practice and its applica-
tion.  Rawls uses the distinction to offer a defense of utilitarian ac-
counts of “punishment” and “promising” as institutions without having 
to justify individual instances of punishing and promise-keeping by 
reference to the same principle.106  We see a similar process employed 
by other philosophers to reconcile instrumental accounts of institutions 
with intrinsic accounts of their individual components.107  It is precise-
ly by adopting this structure of justification for the institution of copy-
right that the obligatory account of copyright law offered here can op-
erate without displacing the instrumental account justifying the very 
need for and existence of copyright as an institution. 
Put in similar terms, then, the institution of copyright can be justi-
fied by the overall instrumental (that is, utilitarian) goal that it serves 
or is directed at realizing: namely, the inducement of creative expres-
sion.  The instrumental account thus answers the question, “why copy-
right?”  Yet in operationalizing the institution and applying it to indi-
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 103 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 491–99 (2004) 
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vidual instances, a decisionmaker need not make reference to the 
overall instrumental goals of the institution, but can instead adopt an 
analysis using the granular devices and concepts on which the liability 
regime relies — all of which revolve around the idea of copying.108 
Even if such compatibility is conceded, it is crucial to understand 
what that compatibility does and does not entail.  Most importantly, it 
avoids a direct conflict between the two accounts, which might other-
wise pull the law in diametrically opposite directions.  The layered na-
ture of the account means that the overall justification for the institu-
tion should exert no normative constraint whatsoever on the 
underlying structure and content of the institution’s devices and mech-
anisms.109  In other words, the precise structure, content, and nature of 
copyright’s obligatory devices can be seen as motivated by variables 
independent of the standard utilitarian or incentives-based account.  
They might be pragmatic, deontological, or indeed instrumental on 
their own, but the crucial point is that their content can be determined 
independently of the system’s overall functioning.  Copyright’s obliga-
tions and incentives can thus go hand in hand, without impeding each 
other.110 
Indeed, this pluralism is in some ways the promise that the New 
Private Law holds out for distinctively statutory (and therefore pre-
sumptively instrumental) institutions such as copyright law.  By allow-
ing institutional structure and justification to operate as independent 
yet overlapping variables, it in many ways allows the analysis to serve 
two disputatious masters simultaneously. 
CONCLUSION 
Only rarely is copyright law — and indeed all of intellectual prop-
erty — thought of as a branch of private law.  Yet when so under-
stood, copyright’s core legal architecture comes to be seen as neither 
contingent nor incidental, but integral to what copyright is.  Perhaps 
most importantly, though, it points to a new way of understanding the 
institution’s goals and purposes.  Attempts to analyze the institution of 
copyright today invariably rely on ideas that are best characterized as 
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“foundational” in some sense, or “top-down” in that they do not origi-
nate in the institution itself.111  Authorial autonomy, or utility-
maximization (on which the incentives account relies) are prominent 
examples of this category.  A private law–rooted, wrong-based under-
standing of copyright along the lines suggested in this Article would 
instead begin by looking at the way in which the institution and its le-
gal directives affect actors within the system.  This understanding 
looks to the language and concepts that the institution employs in or-
der to suggest that there is a coherence (or structure) implicit in the 
working of the system, revolving around the idea of expressive copy-
ing, best described as a “middle-level” principle.112 
Middle-level — or interpretive — principles by their very nature 
mediate the relationship between foundational theories and outcomes 
in individual cases.  Their strength is thought to lie in their ability to 
remain analytically coherent while simultaneously explaining the 
workings of the institution in question, rendering them in one sense 
“pragmatic.”113  The concept of “reliance,” for instance, is a well-
known middle-level principle in contract law.114 
As is to be expected, though, middle-level principles exhibit varying 
levels of compatibility with different foundational ideas.  Given that 
the avowed goal of these principles is explanatory, they provide an ar-
ea of law with a means by which to approach and assess the more ab-
stract, justificatory theories.  “Copying” in copyright law ought to be 
seen as playing precisely such a role, and as an idea, principle, or de-
vice through which the institution’s existing instrumental (and founda-
tional) theories can be mediated.  To be sure, this process may entail 
revising, adapting, or supplementing existing instrumental theories in 
order to account for the centrality of copying to the institution.  The 
incentives story, for instance, might need to be supplemented by moral 
or distributive ideals in some parts.  The net result, however, is likely 
to be a richer and normatively plural account of copyright law that 
pays sufficient attention to both its explanatory and justificatory ideals. 
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